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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known to be vulner-
able to adversarial examples. Existing works have mostly
focused on either digital adversarial examples created via
small and imperceptible perturbations, or physical-world
adversarial examples created with large and less realistic
distortions that are easily identified by human observers. In
this paper, we propose a novel approach, called Adversarial
Camouflage (AdvCam), to craft and camouflage physical-
world adversarial examples into natural styles that appear
legitimate to human observers. Specifically, AdvCam trans-
fers large adversarial perturbations into customized styles,
which are then “hidden” on-target object or off-target back-
ground. Experimental evaluation shows that, in both digital
and physical-world scenarios, adversarial examples crafted
by AdvCam are well camouflaged and highly stealthy, while
remaining effective in fooling state-of-the-art DNN image
classifiers. Hence, AdvCam is a flexible approach that
can help craft stealthy attacks to evaluate the robustness of
DNNs. AdvCam can also be used to protect private infor-
mation from being detected by deep learning systems.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are a family of powerful
models that have been widely used in various AI systems,
and they have achieved a great success across many applica-
tions, such as image classification [13], speech recognition
[26], natural language processing [33], and autonomous
driving [6]. However, DNNs are known to be vulnera-
ble to adversarial examples (or attacks) that are crafted by
adding carefully designed perturbations on normal exam-
ples [25, 12, 20, 2, 27, 28]. This raises serious concerns for
security-critical applications [23, 8, 10, 15, 21]. For exam-
ple, as shown in Figure 1, the addition of a carefully crafted
perturbation that resembles stain, snow and discoloration on
the surface of a stop sign. A self-driving car equipped with
state-of-the-art classifier detects the modified stop sign as
other objects with very high confidence (we will examine
†Correspondence to: Xingjun Ma (xingjun.ma@unimelb.edu.au)
‡Code is available at https://github.com/RjDuan/AdvCam-Hide-Adv-
with-Natural-Styles
how this perturbation was created later).
Figure 1: Camouflaged adversarial examples crafted by
proposed AdvCam attack. Given a target image in (a), an
adversary can choose different camouflage styles from (b)
to craft adversarial examples in (c) that appear naturally oc-
curring, yet can fool a DNN classifier to make incorrect pre-
dictions with high confidence.
Adversarial attacks can be applied in two different set-
tings: 1) digital setting, where the attacker can feed in-
put digital images directly into the DNN classifier; and 2)
physical-world setting, where the DNN classifier only ac-
cepts inputs from a camera and the attacker can only present
adversarial images to the camera. There are three properties
which may be used to characterize adversarial attack: 1)
adversarial strength, which represents the ability to fool
DNNs; 2) adversarial stealthiness, which is about whether
the adversarial perturbations can be detected by human ob-
servers; and 3) camouflage flexibility, which is the degree
to which the attacker can control the appearance of adver-
sarial image.
Most attacking methods have been developed for the dig-
ital setting, such as Projected Gradient Decent (PGD) [22],
Carlini and Wagner (CW) attack [4] and adversarial ex-
amples crafted using generative adversarial networks (Ad-
vGAN) [30]. For digital attacks, small perturbations are
often sufficient. However, physical-world attacks require
large or even unrestricted perturbations [17, 1], since small
perturbations are too subtle to be captured by cameras in
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Figure 2: Examples of successful physical-world attacks.
AdvCam refers to our proposed adversarial camouflage.
complex physical-world environments. There already exist
several attacking methods that go beyond small perturba-
tions, such as adversarial patch (AdvPatch) [3] and robust
physical perturbations (RP2) [10]. The properties of ex-
isting attacks are summarized in Table 1, where ?? means
better than ?. To summarize, stealthiness can be achieved
with small perturbations, which are only useful in digital
setting. Also, existing attacks require exact perturbation
size to achieve stealthiness, while it is difficult to decide a
proper perturbation size for both visual imperceptibility and
adversarial strength, especially in the physical setting. Be-
sides, the generation process of current methods is difficult
to control, e.g., an attacker cannot decide the appearance of
adversarial examples. As such, the camouflage flexibility of
these methods is rather limited. A flexible (yet strong and
stealthy) camouflage mechanism for large perturbations is
still an open problem that needs to be addressed.
Table 1: Summary of existing attacks and our AdvCam.
Attack Digital Physical Stealthiness Flexibility
PGD
√ × ?? ?
AdvPatch × √ ? ?
RP2 × √ ? ?
AdvCam
√ √
?? ??
To address this gap, in this paper, we propose a novel ad-
versarial camouflage approach (AdvCam) to craft and cam-
ouflage adversarial examples into natural styles using style
transfer techniques. The style of an image is an abstract
concept that generally refers to its visual appearance such
as color and texture, in contrast to its structure information
[16]. In AdvCam, the camouflage style and attack region
can be customized by the attacker according to different
attacking scenarios. For example, Figure 1 shows several
adversarial traffic signs crafted by our AdvCam attack. A
quick visual comparison of AdvCam to existing physical-
world attacks can be found in Figure 2. While all the ad-
versarial examples in Figure 2 attack DNNs successfully,
we can see that AdvCam is able to generate adversaial per-
turbation on stop sign with natural stains compared to ar-
tificial graffiti created by RP2, or a camouflaged product
label compared to a patch with obtrusive pattern generated
by AdvPatch. Our proposed AdvCam is capable of generat-
ing highly stealthy adversarial examples, which are robust
to various physical-world conditions at the same time.
In summary, AdvCam is not a perturbation-restricted at-
tack and therefore is not inherently subjected to the limited
amount of perturbation which is typically required in exist-
ing perturbation-restricted techniques. We define a flexible
mechanism that induces perturbation appearing in natural-
looking, which is a totally different paradigm from previous
attacks. It is such an intrinsic difference of the working prin-
ciples that makes AdvCam to produce more realistic images
than existing methods.
Our key contributions in this paper are:
• We propose a flexible adversarial camouflage ap-
proach, AdvCam, to craft and camouflage adversarial
examples.
• AdvCam allows the generation of large perturbations,
customizable attack regions and camouflage styles. It
is very flexible and useful for vulnerability evalua-
tion of DNNs against large perturbations for physical-
world attacks.
• Experiments on both digital and physical-world sce-
narios show that adversarial examples camouflaged by
AdvCam are highly stealthy, while remaining effective
in fooling state-of-the-art DNN image classifiers.
2. Related Work
2.1. Adversarial Attack
Adversarial attack is to generate adversarial examples by
maximizing the classification error of the target model (the
model to attack) [25]. There are targeted and untargeted at-
tacks. Targeted attack is to fool the network to misclassify
the adversarial example into the class that attacker expects,
while untargeted attack is to fool the network to misclas-
sify the adversarial example into any incorrect classes [12].
Adversarial attacks can be applied either in a digital setting
directly on the target model, or in a physical-world setting,
where recaptured photos of adversarial examples are fed to
the target model [17].
2.1.1 Digital attacks
Adversarial examples can be crafted by one or more steps
of perturbation following the direction of adversarial gradi-
ents. This includes the classic Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [12], the Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [17],
the strongest first-order method Projected Gradient Decent
(PGD) [22], and the Skip Gradient Method (SGD) [29] for
transferable attacks. These attacks can either be targeted or
untargeted, and their perturbations are bounded by a small
norm-ball ‖·‖p ≤  with L2 and L∞ being the most com-
monly used norms. Optimization-based attacks, such as
Carlini and Wagner (CW) attack [4] and elastic-net (EAD)
attack [7], directly minimize the perturbations as part of the
adversarial loss.
There also exist several unrestricted adversarial attacks.
These attacks search for modifications on substitutable
components (attributes) of an image such as color [14], tex-
ture and physical parameters [34, 18] while preserving crit-
ical components of images. However, these attacks either
produce large unnatural distortions or rely on training data
that has semantic annotations. Moreover, these attacks can-
not generate complex adversarial patterns and thus are quite
limited for complicated real scenarios. Adversarial exam-
ples can also be generated by generative adversarial net-
works (GANs) [30, 24]. However, it is difficult to craft
targeted attacks for a given test image with GANs, since
the generation process is hard to control.
Most existing attacks achieve stealthiness by either craft-
ing small perturbations or modifying semantic attributes of
the target image. However, a flexible camouflage mech-
anism that can effectively hide adversarial examples with
natural styles is still missing from the literature. In this pa-
per, we address this gap by proposing one such approach.
2.1.2 Physical-world attacks
A study has shown that, by printing and recapturing using a
cell-phone camera, digital adversarial examples can still be
effective [17]. However, follow-up works have found that
such attacks are not easy to realize under physical-world
conditions, due to viewpoint shifts, camera noise, and other
natural transformations [1]. Thus, strong physical-world at-
tacks require large perturbations, and specific adaptations
over a distribution of transformations including lighting, ro-
tation, perspective projection etc. The AdvPatch attack al-
lows large perturbations and is immune to scaling or rota-
tion, thus being directly applicable as a physical-world at-
tack [3]. Adversarial stickers and graffiti have also been
used to attack such as traffic sign classifiers and ImageNet
classifiers in physical-world scenarios [10]. Other physical-
world attacks include adversarial eye-glass frames [23], ve-
hicles [35], or t-shirts [32] that can fool face recognition
systems or object detectors. All these physical-world at-
tacks generate large perturbations to increase adversarial
strength, which inevitably results in large and unrealistic
distortions. This greatly reduces their stealthiness, as shown
in Figure 2.
2.2. Neural Style Transfer
Neural style transfer evolves from the problem of tex-
ture transfer, for which the goal is to transfer the texture
of a source image to a target image while preserving the
structural information of the target image. Traditional tex-
ture transfer methods mainly focus on non-parametric al-
gorithms that resample pixels from the source texture [9].
However, these methods suffer from the fundamental lim-
itation of pixel replacement, i.e., they cannot handle com-
plex styles. Neural style transfer demonstrates remarkable
results for image stylization [11]. In it, the content and style
information of an image can be separated from its feature
representations learned by a convolutional neural network
(CNN). Then, the style information of the style image can
be recombined into the target image to achieve style trans-
fer. This technique has attracted several follow-up works
for different aspects of improvement [5, 19]. In this paper,
we will exploit these techniques for the camouflage of ad-
versarial examples.
3. Our Adversarial Camouflage Approach
In this section, we first give an overview of the adversar-
ial attack problem and our proposed camouflage approach.
We then introduce the loss functions used by our proposed
approach, and adaptations for physical world conditions.
3.1. Overview
Given a test image x ∈ Rm with class label y, a DNN
classifier F : Rm → {1, · · · , k} mapping image pixels to
a discrete label set, and a target class yadv 6= y, adversarial
attack is to find an adversarial example x′ for target image
x by solving the following optimization problem:
minimize D(x, x′) + λ · Ladv(x′)
such that x′ ∈ [0, 255]m, (1)
where D(x, x′) is a distance metric that defines the stealth-
iness property of the adversarial example, Ladv is the ad-
versarial loss, [0, 255] indicates the valid pixel values, λ
is a parameter that adjusts the adversarial strength. Note
that there is a trade-off between stealthiness and adversarial
strength. In the whole experiments, we fix all other param-
eters as constants [19], and only adjust adversarial strength
parameter λ.
Our goal is to develop a mechanism that crafts and cam-
ouflages adversarial examples with large perturbations into
customized styles, and either attack area or style can be de-
fined by attacker flexibly. We use style transfer techniques
to achieve the goal of camouflage and adversarial attack
techniques to achieve adversarial strength. The final loss
is a combination of an adversarial loss Ladv for adversar-
ial strength, a style loss Ls for style generation, a content
loss Lc to preserve the content of the source image and a
smoothness lossLm to generate locally smooth regions. We
denote this final loss as the adversarial camouflage loss:
L = (Ls + Lc + Lm) + λ · Ladv, (2)
where the three loss functions in brackets together serve the
purpose of camouflage. The overview of our approach is il-
lustrated in Figure 3. An attacker defines target image, tar-
get attack region and expected target style. Our proposed
Figure 3: Overview of the proposed approach.
AdvCam then generates adversarial perturbation with ex-
pected style on the expected area as shown on the right of
Figure 3. To make adverarial example robust to various en-
vironment conditions, including lighting, rotation, etc., we
add an extra physical adaptation training for generated x′ in
each step.
3.2. Adversarial Camouflage Loss
3.2.1 Style loss
For traditional attacks, the stealthiness metric is defined by
D(x, x′) = ‖x− x′‖p, where ‖·‖p is the Lp norm and L2
and L∞ are typically used. This is to constrain the pertur-
bations to be “small”. For our proposed camouflage, the
stealthiness is defined by a style metric between adversar-
ial example x′ and a style reference image xs. The style
distance between two images can be defined by their differ-
ences in style representations:
Ds =
∑
l∈Sl
∥∥∥G(F˜l(xs))− G(F˜l(x′))∥∥∥2
2
, (3)
where F˜ is a feature extractor (such as a public DNN model)
that can be different from the target model, and G is the
Gram matrix of deep features extracted at a set of style lay-
ers of F˜ [11]. As different styles can be learned at different
layers, we use all convolutional layers of the network as the
style layers. To generate stylized perturbation in expected
area of the target image, we denote the masks that define
the attack and non-attack regions byM andM respectively.
After each step in generation process, we mask the adver-
sarial image x′ by M to make only attack region modifiable
with non-attack area unchanged (x masked by M ).
3.2.2 Content loss
The above style loss can craft an adversarial image in the
reference style, however, the content of the adversarial im-
age may appear very different to that of the original image.
The content of the original image can be preserved by a
content preservation loss:
Lc =
∑
l∈Cl
∥∥∥F˜l(x)− F˜l(x′)∥∥∥2
2
, (4)
where Cl represents the set of content layers used for ex-
tracting content representations. This is to ensure that the
adversarial image has very similar content to the original
image in the deep representation space. We use deeper lay-
ers of the feature extractor network as the content layers.
Note that the content loss is optional when the attack
only occurs in a small region that does not contain any par-
ticular content. However, if the attack region contains se-
mantic content, the content loss can help reduce the seman-
tic difference between the adversarial image and its original
version.
3.2.3 Smoothness loss
The smoothness of the adversarial image can be improved
by reducing the variations between adjacent pixels. For an
adversarial image x′, the smoothness loss is defined as:
Lm =
∑
((x′i,j − xi+1,j)2 + (x′i,j − xi,j+1)2)
1
2 , (5)
where x′i,j is the pixel at coordinate (i, j) of image x
′. Intu-
itively, this will encourage the image to have low-variance
(e.g. smooth) local patches. We note that the smooth-
ness loss is limited in improving stealthiness if the surface
of both the target image and the style image are already
smooth. But we still recommend adding it in physical set-
ting, as Sharif et al. pointed out [23], the smoothness term is
useful for improving the robustness of adversarial examples
in physical environment.
3.2.4 Adversarial loss
For the adversarial loss Ladv , we use the following cross-
entropy loss:{
log(py(x
′)), for untargeted attack,
− log(pyadv (x′)) + log(py(x′)), for targeted attack
(6)
where pyadv () is the probability output (softmax on logits)
of the target model F with respect to class yadv . We note
that the proposed camouflage attack is not restricted to the
particular form of the adversarial loss, and can be used in
combination with existing attacking methods.
3.3. Adaptation for Physical-world Conditions
To make adversaries generated by AdvCam physically
realizable, we model physical conditions in the process of
generating camouflaged adversaries. As the physical-world
environment often involves condition fluctuations such as
viewpoint shifts, camera noise, and other natural transfor-
mations [1], we use a series of adaptations to accommodate
such varying conditions. In particular, we adapt a technique
similar to Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) [1] but
without expectation. In Xie’s work [31], they also adapted
EOT to improve the transferability of adversarial exam-
ples. However, we aim to improve the adaptation of ad-
versarial examples under various physical conditions. Thus
we consider the transformations for simulation of physical-
world condition fluctuations, including rotation, scale re-
size, color shift (to simulate lightening change) and random
background.
min
x′
(
(Ls + Lc + Lm) + max
T∈T
λ · Ladv(o+ T (x′)
)
, (7)
where o represents a random background image that we
sample in the physical world, and T represents a random
transformation of rotation, resize and color shift.
In principle, “vision” is the main sense of perception for
both human observers and DNN models. By adjusting the
style reference image xs according to the original image x
and the background image o, the proposed camouflage at-
tack can craft highly stealthy adversarial examples that can
deceive both human observers and DNN models.
4. Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we first outline the experimental setup.
Then we analyze our AdvCam attack via an ablation study.
Afterwords, we evaluate camouflage performance of Ad-
vCam by human perception study for digital attacks, and
also present several adversarial examples of high stealth-
iness crafted by AdvCam. We further perform physical-
world attacks at last.
4.1. Experimental Setup
4.1.1 Baseline attacks
we compare our AdvCam attack with two existing repre-
sentative methods: PGD [22] and adversarial patch (Adv-
Patch) [3]. PGD represents the digital attacks, which is the
strongest first-order attack. And AdvPatch represents the
unrestricted attacks that can directly applied to the physical-
world setting. Some other physical-world attacks such as
RP2 require case-by-case manual design, thus are limited
for mass production. We compare the methods in terms of
attack success rate and visual effect. For AdvCam attack,
we use the same layers of the network as used in [19] to
extract style and content (where necessary) representations.
4.1.2 Threat model
We test both targeted and untargeted attacks in both dig-
ital and physical-world settings. The threat model adopts
a gray-box setting: the source and target networks are both
VGG-19 networks but were trained separately on ImageNet.
For a physical-world test, we first use a Google Pixel2
smartphone to take a photo of the target object, then craft an
adversarial image in the digital setting attacking the source
network, after which we print out the adversarial image to
replace or place it on the target object, then we re-photo the
object using the same smartphone from various viewing an-
gles and distances. The physical-word attack success rate is
measured by the prediction accuracy of the target network
on the re-photoed adversarial images.
4.2. Ablation Study
Here, we conduct a series of experiments on ImageNet
to analyze the following aspects of our AdvCam attack: 1)
shape and location of camouflage region, 2) camouflage
losses (e.g. style loss, content loss and smoothness loss),
and 3) adversarial strength parameter λ and region size.
4.2.1 Camouflage region: shape and location
Here, we show how the selection of camouflage region in
terms of shape and location impacts the adversarial strength
of the crafted adversarial example. Given a selected attack-
ing region with shape and size, we increase strength param-
eter λ from 1000 to 10000 with interval 1000 until the at-
tack succeeds. The range is selected according to extensive
experiments, [1000, 10000] is an effective range to find ad-
versary with both high adversarial strength and stealthiness.
Figure 4 shows camouflaged adversarial examples crafted
with different regions. We find that either the camouflage
region is at the center or away from the center of the target
object, attacks can succeed with high confidence. We will
show in the last part of this subsection that attacks can be
camouflaged into an area that is even off the target object,
secretly hidden in the background.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 4: Ablation of region shape and size, on two targeted attacks: “backpack”→ “tank” (top row) and “poncho”→ “traffic
light”. (a): original clean image with intended style (bottom left corner). (b) - (e): left: selected attack region, right: crafted
camouflage adversarial example with top-1 prediction (“predicted class, confidence”) given at the bottom of the image.
(a) Original (b) Ls (c) Ls+Lc (d) All
Figure 5: Ablation of the 3 camouflage losses: (a): original
images with intended camouflage style at the bottom right
corner; (b) - (d): camouflaged adversarial examples using
different loss functions.
4.2.2 Camouflage losses (Ls, Lc, Lm)
Figure 5 illustrates three groups of adversarial examples
camouflaged with or without the two optional enhance-
ments (content preservation Lc and smoothness enhance-
ment Lm). When incorporating one enhancement, its loss
function is directly added to the final object by following
Eq. (2) (λ in Ladv was set to 2000). As can be observed,
the content preservation can help preserve the original con-
tent as in the “traffic sign” example (third column), while
smoothness enhancement can help produce a smooth ob-
ject surface. These enhancements are optional because they
improve the visual appearance only slightly for some ad-
versarial examples, for example, content preservation in the
“table lamp”example (third row) or smoothness enhance-
ment in all examples.
4.2.3 Adversarial strength (λ) and region size
We craft both targeted and untargeted camouflage attacks
on randomly selected 2000 ImageNet test images from 50
categories with varying λ ∈ [1000, 10000]. For targeted at-
Figure 6: Ablation of adversarial strength λ and region size:
success rate of untargeted (left) and targeted attack (right).
tack, the target class is randomly selected and is different to
the true class. To also test the influence of λ under different
attack regions, here we also vary the size of the region from
40*40 to 120*120. Figure 6 illustrates the top-1/5 success
rates, which are measured by whether the target class is in
the top-1/5 classes. As shown in the figure, when the region
is fixed, larger adversarial strength λ can increase success
rate by up to 20%; and when λ is fixed, larger attack region
can improve success rate by up to 40%. Compared to tar-
geted attacks, untargeted attacks are much easier to succeed.
Between top-1 and top-5 success rates, top-1 targeted at-
tacks are more difficult to achieve (solid lines are lower than
dashed lines). The standard errors with respect to different
adversarial strengths and region sizes are between 0.07%
and 1.13%. Note that in these experiments, the camouflage
styles and locations of attack region are selected randomly,
which may decrease the camouflage effect and success rate.
However, this does not affect the conclusion that larger λ
and region size can help craft stronger attacks.
4.3. Digital Attacks
4.3.1 Attack setting
We randomly select 150 clean images from 5 categories
of ImageNet ILSVRC2012 test set. We then apply the
three methods (PGD, AdvPatch and our AdvCam) to craft
a targeted adversarial example for each clean image. The
pairs of selected source and target classes are: “ashcan”→
“robin”, “backpack”→ “water jug”, “cannon”→ “folklift”,
“jersey” → “horizontal bar”, “mailbox” → “entertainment
center”. For PGD and AdvCam, we attack the main ob-
ject region obtained via manual selection, while for Adv-
Patch, we further select a circular attack area inside of the
object region. For PGD, we use maximum perturbation
 = 16/255 (denoted as PGD-16). For AdvCam, we ran-
domly select a second image from the same category as the
style image, and gradually increase λ from 1000 to 10000
until an adversarial example is found. For fair comparison,
we filter out the failed adversarial examples. Finally, we
collect 132, 101, 122 adversarial examples for PGD, Ad-
vPatch and AdvCam respectively. Figure 7 shows a few
crafted adversarial examples by the three methods that we
used to perform human perception study.
(a) Original (b) PGD-16 (c) AdvPatch (d) AdvCam
Figure 7: The original and adversarial images crafted by
PGD-16, AdvPatch and our AdvCam attack.
4.3.2 Human perception study results
We set up a human perception study on Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk (AMT) to ask human evaluators to choose whether
a shown image is “natural and realistic” or “not natural or
realistic”. To simulate adversarial examples in a real world
scenario, we present users with three types of adversar-
ial images in random order and individually rather than in
pairs. Finally, we collected 1953 selections from 130 par-
ticipants. AdvPatch was chosen as “natural and realistic”
19.0 ± 1.68% of the time, PGD was chosen 77.3 ± 1.53%
of the time, while our AdvCam was chosen 80.7 ± 1.53%
of the time. We summarize these statistics as stealthiness
scores for the three methods and show in Figure 8. This con-
firms that our proposed AdvCam attack is capable of craft-
ing adversarial examples that are as stealthy as the small
perturbation PGD-16 method, although the perturbations of
AdvCam attacks are unrestricted in size.
Figure 8: Stealthiness of AdvPatch, PGD-16 and AdvCam.
4.3.3 Customized examples
Here, we show how AdvCam can craft extremely stealthy
camouflages, especially off-target ones. Figure 9 illustrates
a few such examples. The first-row shows on-target camou-
flage examples, and the second-row shows off-target cam-
ouflages, which are crafted by attacking a carefully chosen
background area. For on-target ones, AdvCam generates
natural and stealthy perturbation on the surface of the target
objects. For off-target ones, in the first off-target example
(left two images in the second row), we hide the attack into
the price tag to fool a VGG-19 classifier to misclassify a
revolver into a toilet tissue. In the second example (mid-
dle two images in the second row), AdvCam successfully
camouflages a blenheim spaniel into a bearskin by adding
flowers in the background. In the third example (right two
images in the second row), we camouflage the attack into
the wall posters in the background which causes a minivan
parked in front of the wall to be misrecognized as a traffic
light. These examples not only demonstrate the stealthiness
and flexibility of our AdvCam attack, but also indicate that
threats to deep learning systems are ubiquitous, and in many
cases, may hardly be noticeable even to human observers.
4.4. Physical-world Attacks
We further design three physical-world attacking scenar-
ios to test the camouflage power of our AdvCam attack.
We also perform AdvPatch and PGD attacks for compari-
son. For PGD attack, we test different  in (16/255, 32/255,
64/255, 128/255) and show successful adversarial examples
with the least . We print out the adversarial patterns on a
A3 or A4 paper, then take 20 photos at various viewing an-
gles and distances.
The fist scenario is to camouflage a wild pattern into
a street sign, which could cause problems for self-driving
cars. The top row in Figure 10 illustrates some success-
ful patterns crafted by PGD-128 ( = 128/255), AdvPatch
and AdvCam. As can be seen, the attack is perfectly cam-
ouflaged by AdvCam into the texture of the tree. Although
PGD is highly stealthy in digital setting, it requires large
perturbation ( = 128/255) in physical environment. Thus
the adversarial pattern is much less stealthy than AdvCam,
same as AdvPatch. The second scenario is to protect the
identity of a person wearing a jersey. We simulate such a
Figure 9: Camouflaged adversarial images crafted by our AdvCam attack and their original versions.
(a) AdvPatch (b) PGD-128 (c) AdvCam
Figure 10: Top: Adversarial wood texture recognized as
street sign. Bottom: Adversarial logo on t-shirt.
Figure 11: Adversarial traffic sign with 3 styles of stains.
scenario by attacking the jersey using a camouflaged fash-
ion logo “pikachu” (see bottom row in Figure 10). All the
three attacks perform the “jersey” to “Irish terrier” attack.
Note that PGD failed the attack even with the largest per-
turbation tested. This shows the high flexibility of AdvCam
with customized camouflage styles, providing a flexible cre-
ation of stealthiness satisfying various attacking scenarios.
We also perform a “street sign” to “barbershop” attack
using AdvCam with three different natural styles (see Figure
11). The patterns of AdvCam are smooth and natural that
can hardly be detected by human observers, but deceive the
classifier with high confidence successfully. To summarize,
with high stealthiness of adversaries generated by AdvCam,
it poses ubiquitous threats for current DNNs-based systems.
Thus AdvCam can be a useful tool to evaluate the robustness
of DNNs employed in the physical-world.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have investigated the stealthiness of ad-
versarial examples, and propose a novel approach called
adversarial camouflage (AdvCam), which combines neu-
ral style transfer and adversarial attack techniques, to craft
and camouflage adversarial examples into stealthy natural-
looking styles. AdvCam is a flexible approach that can
help craft stealthy attacks for robustness evaluation of DNN
models. Apart from the view of attack, the proposed Adv-
Cam can be a meaningful camouflage technique to protect
objects or human being detected by both human observers
and DNN based equipments.
The proposed AdvCam currently still requires the at-
tacker to manually specify the attack region and target style,
where we plan to explore semantic segmentation techniques
to automatically achieve this in our future work. Also, we
will explore to apply AdvCam on other computer vision
tasks including object detection and segmentation. More-
over, effective defense strategies against camouflaged at-
tacks will be another crucial and promising direction.
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